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I Introduction
As a result of advances in medical technology in the second half of 
the 20th century, it is now possible for children to be conceived ex vivo 
through utilising artificial human reproductive technology (hereinafter 
referred to as ART). This has inevitably led to a myriad of novel and 
often difficulty legal questions for judges and regulators to contend 
with. Particular difficulties arise where one of the gamete providers to 
a proposed ART procedure has died prior to it being carried out. While 
it has always been the case that a child could be born after the death of 
his or her father, this new technology now means that children can be 
both conceived and born after their father’s death. 1
Such children may be conceived by utilising frozen ejaculate sperm 
harvested and stored before the father’s death, or by posthumous sperm 
retrieval after death. 
Post-conception disputes concern filiation (who, if anybody, is the 
child’s legal father?) and inheritance (can or should the child be able to 
claim against the deceased father’s estate?).2 Pre-conception controversies 
focus on the entitlement, if any, to harvest sperm from the potential 
father when he is not in a position to consent by reason of incapacity 
(being in a coma, for instance) or death, as well as the related question 
as to whether the sperm can then be used in an ART procedure for the 
purposes of posthumous reproduction by his surviving wife or partner. 
One such pre-conception controversy3 came before the New Zealand 
* Lecturer in Law, Maynooth University, County Kildare, Ireland. The 
research for this comment was carried out during a sabbatical period 
spent at the Centre for Law and Emerging Technologies at the University 
of Otago and I am grateful to Professor Colin Gavaghan for hosting me 
during this period and for drawing my attention to this case. 
1 See generally N Peart “Life Beyond Death: Regulating Posthumous 
Reproduction in New Zealand” (2015) 46 (3) VUWL Rev 725; CA 
Scharman “Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the Posthumously 
Conceived Child” (2002) 55 Vand L Rev 1001; BM Star “A Matter of Life 
and Death: Posthumous Conception” (2003) 64 La L Rev 613; and G 
Bahadur “Death and Conception” (2002) 17 Human Reproduction 2769. 
2 See N Maddox “Inheritance and the Posthumously Conceived Child” 
(2017) 81(6) Conv 405.
3 Although to describe this case as a controversy or dispute is a little 
inaccurate given all of the interested parties were supportive of the 
application. 
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High Court recently in Re Lee (Long),4 and this case is a good example 
of the difficult and fraught nature of litigation involving posthumous 
conception, as well as the legal vacuum in which judges must currently 
operate in New Zealand in such cases.
II Background  
The deceased and the applicant had been in a stable de facto relationship 
for 20 years. For a number of years they had tried to have children by 
natural means, and when these attempts failed, they sought fertility 
treatment and to this end the deceased gave sperm samples on two 
occasions to test its suitability for in vitro fertilisation.5 These samples 
were not preserved, however. Somewhat unexpectedly, the applicant 
became pregnant naturally. She gave birth to a healthy baby after the 
deceased died suddenly and unexpectedly. Prior to the death, both the 
deceased and the applicant had communicated their desire to have more 
than one child, as they wanted their first child to have one sibling. The 
deceased’s desire to have children was in part attributable to traditional 
ethnic values that encouraged continuing his bloodline and having 
grandchildren for his parents.6 While the deceased clearly consented 
to fertility procedures during his lifetime, as is common in cases of this 
nature, he had not turned his mind to the possibility of his sperm being 
used posthumously and there was thus no consent to this posthumous 
use.7  Nor was there evidence that he would object to such a use.  
The coroner refused to authorise the extraction of sperm from 
the deceased’s body for want of jurisdiction and an urgent ex parte 
application was made before Heath J in the High Court. Had an interim 
order for removal of the sperm not been made at this interim hearing, the 
applicant’s case would have been rendered moot at this early stage as no 
viable sperm could be collected from the body once 48 hours had passed 
from the death.8 Accordingly, an interim order was made authorising 
the sperm retrieval which was duly performed, and the order extended 
to storage by a recognised facility as agents of the Court.
In the subsequent substantive application, the applicant sought orders 
confirming the interim orders that permitted the removal and storage 
of the sperm samples. She also sought orders granting her possession 
and control of the samples so that she may use them for her own fertility 
4 Re Lee (Long) [2017] NZHC 3263, [2018] 2 NZLR 731. 
5 At [3]–[4].
6 At [5]–[6]. 
7 Healthy young men do not generally consider death as something 
that eds to be planned for: K Tremellen and J Savulescu “A Discussion 
Supporting Presumed Consent For Posthumous Sperm Procurement and 
Conception” (2015) 30 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 6; SE Barton 
and others “Population-based Study of Attitudes Towards Posthumous 
Reproduction” (2012) 98 Fertility and Sterility 735.
8 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [16].
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treatment if authorised to do so under the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Act 2004 (the HART Act) or if not authorised under the act, 
to export them so that she may receive treatment in another jurisdiction.9
The Court concluded that there were no statutory or regulatory 
provisions that dealt with a person such as the applicant seeking to collect 
and use sperm from a deceased spouse or partner10 and the decision 
turned on two matters; first, whether the applicant had acquired any 
property interest in the sperm that she could enforce as of right, and 
alternatively, whether the Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction 
to assist the applicant? 
III Sperm as Property?  
In deciding if the applicant was entitled to use her late partner’s sperm 
samples, the Court first asked if she had any property rights in them.11 
The question as to whether human gametes can be considered property 
is complex and contentious. There is an old common law rule that there 
can be “no property in the body”, although it is of dubious origin, it does 
represent the law.12 As a person does not “own” their body in anything 
other than a rhetorical sense, it cannot form the subject matter of a 
bequest.13 Potentially, the rule may not apply if a piece of the body has 
become separated from it prior to death, and the decedent takes control 
of it. This occurred in Hecht v Superior Court (Kane),14 where the decedent 
had frozen sperm samples prior to his suicide and bequeathed them to 
his surviving partner, with a written direction that they be used by her 
for posthumous reproduction. As the samples were under the control 
of the decedent prior to his death, they were recognised as property for 
the purposes of the California succession statute. 
A similar approach was taken in the recent English case of Yearworth 
v North Bristol NHS Trust,15 where sperm had been frozen on behalf of 
living men who were about to begin chemotherapy. The Court of Appeal 
considered that they had retained some control over these samples and 
they thus could be considered the property of the men, at least to the 
extent that would allow them to sue for breach of bailment when the 
samples were inadvertently destroyed by the clinic. However, these 
authorities were irrelevant in Re Lee (Long) as the sperm was not separated 
9 At [22].
10 Although, I doubt that it was correct on this point: see below at section 
4.  
11 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [77]–[91].
12 Haynes’ case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113, 77 ER 1389; Exelby v Handyside (Dr 
Handyside’s case) (1749) 2 East PC 652; R v Lynn (1788) 2 TR 733, 100 ER 394 
(KB); Re Sharpe (1857) Dears and Bell  160, 169 ER 959; R v Price (1884) 
12 QBD 247; and M Pawlowski “Property in Body Parts and Products of 
the Human Body” (2009) 30 Liverpool Law Rev 35–55.
13 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659.
14 Hecht v Superior Court (Kane) 20 Cal Rptr 2d 275 (Ct App 1993).
15 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37, [2010] QB 1.
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from the body until after death and could not be said to have ever been 
under the deceased’s control during his lifetime.16
There is an exception to the “no property” rule that allows the next-
of-kin to take possession of the corpse, but only for the purposes of 
facilitating burial. Such rights are not really in the nature of ownership 
and are “transitive and purposive custodial rights” only.17 Such limited 
rights would not permit the next-of-kin to appropriate the body for their 
own use, as this would be unconnected with burial. 
1 Court Declines to Follow Doodeward v Spence (1908)
Heath J considered a series of recent Australian cases where property had 
been recognised in sperm as the application of lawful “work and skill” 
had served to differentiate the samples from mere dead tissue awaiting 
burial.18 In these cases, the act of freezing and storing sperm was sufficient 
for the Australian courts to recognise the sperm as property, at least to 
the extent of creating an entitlement to possession of it. These decisions 
were based on the somewhat unusual, and undoubtedly gruesome, 
Australian authority of Doodeward v Spence,19 a case where in issue was 
the ownership of a stillborn two-headed baby preserved with spirits in a 
jar. The majority of the Australian High Court held that the preservation 
of the baby was an act of work or skill that entitled the surgeon to retain 
possession of the body and maintain an action for its recovery; however 
the decision was not unanimous and Higgins J dissented on the basis 
that there could be no property in a corpse.20 Recently, however, the 
New Zealand Supreme Court in Takamore v Clarke declined to follow 
the majority in Doodeward, preferring the dissent of Higgins J in holding 
that “the New Zealand common law position” is that “there can be no 
property in the dead body of a human being”.21
Heath J felt bound by the Supreme Court decision and noted that if 
there is no property in a dead body:22
16 Heath J expressly distinguished Yearworth on this basis, Re Lee (Long), 
above n 5, at [91].
17 Heather Conway “Dead, But Not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family 
Conflicts” (2003) LS 423 at 426-427.
18 Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177; and Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd 
[2010] QSC 118, (2011) 2 Qd R 207; Roche v Douglas [2000] WASC 146,  (2000) 
22 WAR 331; Re Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478, (2011) 81 NSWLR 198; and 
Loane Skene “Property Interests in Human Bodily Material: Yearworth, 
Recent Australian Cases of Stored Semen and Their Implications” (2012) 
20 Med L Rev 227.
19 Doodewood v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406.
20 At 414–416 per Griffith CJ and at 417 per Barton J; whereas Higgins J 
dissented on the basis that there could be no property in a corpse. 
21 Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, [2013] 2 NZLR 733 at [117]; considered 
by Heath J in Re Lee (Long) above n 5, at [78] and [82]–[91].
22 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [83].
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… it is difficult to see how there might be property in any component 
part of a dead body; perhaps more so when dealing with genetic material 
located inside a particular body part.
He adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales in Yearworth when it declined to follow Doodeward in relation to the 
freezing of human sperm. The Yearworth Court held (and Heath J agreed) 
that the Doodeward work/skill exception was a principle formulated as 
an exception to a principle that was itself of exceptional character (ie 
the “no property in the body” rule) and was inherently arbitrary in its 
operation.23 
He further justified not following Doodeward, as the preserved baby 
in the case was not treated with the respect that modern society would 
afford to human remains being described as, for example, “a dead-born 
foetal  monster” and “an aberration of nature” not properly to be regarded 
as a corpse that should have a Christian burial.24 This view of the corpse 
was at variance with the current position in New Zealand law, noted 
Heath J, where provision is made for the registration of still-born children 
and burial rights, and the treatment of the body in Doodeward would 
potentially constitute a crime under the Crimes Act 1961.25  Furthermore, 
he noted the decision is inconsistent with the regulatory regime set out in 
the HART Act which vests decision making power in relation to frozen 
sperm in an Ethics Committee, and not as would be the case if the sperm 
was recognised as her property, the applicant herself.26  
2 Status versus allocative questions
When we discuss whether there is “property” in human tissue, it is not 
always clear what is being talked about, as there is a tendency for judges 
and academic commentators to elide differing issues with regard to 
human materials under the rubric of property, often misapplying basic 
property law concepts. Douglas and Goold highlight three areas in which 
property principles are commonly misunderstood: initial allocation of 
rights, how to dispose of a right and the content of rights.27 A common 
misstep by the courts (as happened in Yearworth and Moore v Regents of 
the University of California)28 is conflating the normative question as to 
whether sperm ought to be property (the “status” question) with the 
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23 Williams v Williams, above n 14.. 
24 Doodeward v Spence, above n 18, at 416 per Barton J; considered by Heath 
J in Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [85]–[88].
25 Crimes Act 1961, s 150(b), being a child who has been born under s 2 of 
the Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Act 1995; 
see also s 46A of the Burial and Cremation Act 1964, and ss 42 and 45 of 
the Coroners Act 2006.
26 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [88]. 
27 S Douglas and I Goold “Property in Human Biomaterials: A New 
Methodology” (2016) 75 CLJ 478.
28 Moore v Regents of the University of California 499 US 936 (1990).
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question of deciding in whom the rights would vest (the “allocation” 
question).29 In both Moore and Yearworth, it was assumed that a resolution 
of the status question in favour of property rights existing in the 
biomaterials would mean those rights automatically vest in the source 
of the tissue. This approach ignores the traditional legal rules governing 
the acquisition of property; namely, first possession (ie who first takes 
possession of a newly created unowned object) and specification (whereby 
the creator of a new object is recognised as its owner).   
The Court in Re Lee (Long) falls into a similar trap: it decides the question 
as to whether there should be property in sperm at all by reference to the 
allocation question: whether the surviving partner had property in the 
samples. Furthermore, Heath J determines the allocation question only by 
reference to one of the rules for acquisition of property; he does not, for 
instance, consider if the sperm is res nullius once it has been taken from 
the body, and thus capable of being taken into possession so as to justify 
property vesting in the first possessor. That is not to say that the Court’s 
conclusions are incorrect on this issue; rather it omits the consideration 
of certain relevant principles when arriving at them. 
The Court was undoubtedly correct to criticise Doodeward v Spence as 
leading to potentially anomalous outcomes; in particular that ownership 
of these materials is possible on the happenstance that some process 
is applied to them so as to alter them in some material way. Once one 
admits that ownership can vest on the basis of Doodeward when sperm 
is extracted from dead or comatose patients, as the Australian courts 
have done, a Pandora’s box of allocative problems present themselves, 
as was noted by the Stewart J in a recent Scottish case, Holdich v Lothian 
Health Board, a case involving similar issues:30
Maybe the clinician in such a case is to be characterised as an agent 
effecting occupatio on behalf of the patient. On the other hand both 
parties seem to agree that there is no contract in relation to the provision 
of treatment … so that, presumably, there is no scope for a contract of 
agency either … [furthermore] [t]o whom does the sperm belong when 
these techniques are used; and is it correct to postulate only permanently 
or terminally comatose, dying subjects and dead subjects. The answer 
to the latter question is “no” since the technique of electro-ejaculation 
is available for paraplegic patients. What happens to ownership if the 
patient recovers consciousness, say, or ceases to be paralysed?
Questions of property would also seem to create a disconnection 
between the question of ownership (has there been application of work/
skill?) with how best to value the procreative wishes of the dying or 
comatose source of the sperm. In addition, as was canvassed in the 
Holdich case, one could convincingly argue that freezing of sperm does 
29 Douglas and Goold, above n 26, at 480–484. 
30 Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, 2014 SLT 495 (OH) at 
[37]–[38] per Stewart J.
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not really alter its inherent attributes; instead, it seeks to preserve them.31 
Property law is attractive to judges faced with making choices in hard 
cases such as Re Lee (Long) in a legal vacuum: by recognising property 
in these materials it allows a remedy to be provided where otherwise 
there would be none.32The danger is to then engage in consequentialist 
reasoning aimed at finding property in order to achieve the favoured 
result without the necessary justificatory work, or without sufficient 
consideration for the impact on subsequent cases.33 This is essentially 
what happened in the Australian cases of Re Edwards34 and Re H, AE35 
where as in Re Lee (Long) both decedents had died before the sperm 
sample had been extracted, and neither had signed the necessary consent 
forms during their lifetime. As in Yearworth, the Court in Re Lee (Long) 
avoided the temptation of utilising the peculiar precedent of Doodeward 
to decide a hard case, and sought another basis for its decision. 
Yearworth was of course distinguishable, as the men in that case had 
had their sperm samples frozen during their lifetime, and retained a 
measure of control of them. Similarly, in both Hecht36 and Bazley v Monash 
IVF Pty Ltd,37 the sperm samples had been frozen and stored before the 
death of the donor. As the donor retained control of the samples before 
his death in these cases, the Court could be justified in finding that the 
deceased had property in them during his lifetime and they could pass 
by succession.38 
Heath J left open the question as to whether similar facts would lead 
to the same conclusion in New Zealand, and this may happen as control 
rights (even the limited and circumscribed rights that a man may retain 
over his stored sperm) are often, although not always, regarded as 
synonymous with property.39 Accordingly, the Court did not rule out ever 
recognising sperm as some form of property under New Zealand law, 
Retrieval and Use of Sperm after Death
31 One could of course counter this argument by saying that sperm is 
inherently perishable once it is outside the body and the act of freezing 
alters this attribute.
32 RN Nwabueze “Donated Organs, Property Rights and the Remedial 
Quagmire” (2008) 16 Med L Rev 201.
33 I Goold and M Quigley “Human Biomaterials: The Case for a Property 
Approach” in I Goold and others (eds) Persons, Parts and Property: How 
Should We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2014) 231 at 231–241. 
34 Re Edwards, above n 19.
35 Re H, AE (No 2), above n 19.
36 Hecht v Superior Court (Kane), above n 15.
37 Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd, above n 19.
38 The court applied Yearworth and found there had been a gratuitous 
bailment of the samples during the deceased’s lifetime.
39 N Maddox “Property, Control and Separated Human Biomaterials” (2017) 
24 EJHL 24. 
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providing it seems the sample is in storage during the life of the testator.40 
One would hope that when such a case comes before a New Zealand 
court, it does not simply treat control as synonymous with property 
and addresses the status question thoroughly before considering the 
allocative question. This status question is a live debate in the academic 
literature and it would be fitting to see it have judicial attention.41
IV The Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction
The Court reviewed the HART Act and found that the use of sperm 
extracted from a dead man who did consent to this specific posthumous 
use was not prohibited by the Act, and the applicant could apply to the 
Ethics Committee established by the Act for permission to use the sperm 
for fertilisation.42 It was held that the Committee, and not the Court, 
was the appropriate entity to decide if the applicant was entitled to use 
the sperm, as it was the specialist body created by Parliament to make 
such decisions. As a result, the Court restricted itself to determining the 
lawfulness of the posthumous extraction of the sperm.43 Of course, the 
difficulty for the applicant, and the nub of the case, was that failure to 
extract and store the sperm in the two day period following the death of 
her partner would mean she would be unable to make this application.44 
Heath J solved the difficulty by invoking the Court’s inherent 
jurisdiction and permitting the extraction and freezing of the sperm 
as “doing no more than filling a legislative gap to provide a means 
by which sperm can be collected and stored pending a substantive 
application to the Ethics Committee as to its subsequent use”, ensuring 
that an otherwise “lawful process be undertaken, which otherwise 
would be frustrated”.45 He found that the exercise of this jurisdiction 
in these circumstances did not conflict with any statutory or regulatory 
40 This approach to recognising property in sperm has not, however, found 
favour everywhere. In the Scottish case Holdich v Lothian Health Board 
[2013] CSOH 197, Stewart J felt that the Yearworth court had gone too far in 
classifying sperm as property; and canvassed the view that frozen sperm 
is rather a “thing” in relation to which the possessory remedies of delict 
and delivery are available, and it thus could be the subject of a contract 
of safekeeping breach of which is actionable. This does not equate with 
property.
41 See, for example: J Wall “The Trespasses of Property Law” (2014) 40(1) J 
Med Ethics 19; W Boulier “Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need 
to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts” (1994) 23 Hofstra L 
Rev 693; and RP Jansen “Sperm and Ova as Property” (1985) 11(3)J Med 
Ethics 123.
42 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [52]–[55] and [92]–[98].
43 Pursuant to Human Reproduction Act 2004, s 28. 
44 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [101].
45 At [100]. 
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provision, which would otherwise constrain the exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction.46 Section 16 of the Judicature Act 1906 provided a statutory 
basis for the seemingly open-ended nature of the inherent jurisdiction 
providing that the High Court would have all jurisdiction that it had on 
the coming into operation of the Act as well as “all judicial jurisdiction 
which may be necessary to administer the laws of New Zealand”.47 
Heath J considered two aspects of the inherent jurisdiction in aid of his 
submission that the High Court could invoke it in this case: the parens 
patriae and administration jurisdictions. The former was exercised as 
part of the Court’s traditional wardship jurisdiction, and was aimed 
primarily at protecting vulnerable children. In Re JSB (A Child),48 Heath 
J. invoked the jurisdiction to justify making orders as to what would 
happen on the death of a still-living child. Re Jones (deceased)49 was cited as 
an example of the administration jurisdiction. Jones was a succession law 
case where those entitled under statute to extract letters of administration 
were not willing to do so. In the absence of express statutory authority, 
the Court in Jones invoked the inherent jurisdiction to justify allowing a 
grant in favour of a person willing to administer the estate. From these 
cases Heath J conceptualised the inherent jurisdiction as a continuum, 
stating in JSB (in a passage cited with approval in Re Lee (Long)) that:50
Parens patriae and administration are two manifestations of the inherent 
jurisdiction. Together, they demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction 
applying to a continuum, from the beginning of life until after its end. 
While the former is directed to the living and the latter to the dead … 
the Judicature Act draws no distinction between aspects of the inherent 
jurisdiction.
With respect to the learned judge, this view of the inherent jurisdiction 
and its application to the facts of Re Lee (Long) marks a significant 
widening of the court’s powers. Furthermore, the facts of Re Lee (Long) 
are significantly different from previous cases in which the inherent 
jurisdiction has been invoked by the New Zealand courts. As noted 
by Jacob in his seminal article on the topic, the inherent jurisdiction 
traditionally applied to narrow procedural issues involving contempt of 
court or abuses of the processes of the court.51 Additionally, as is evident 
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46 Re Lee (Long), above n 5. Heath J cites Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] 
NZSC 68, [2013] 3 NZLR 441 and the Supreme Court decision in Mafart 
v Television New Zealand [2006] NZSC 33, [2006] 3 NZLR 18 as setting 
out this legal test; Equity and common law principles may also constrain 
the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction Burgess v Monk [2017] NZHC 2424.
47 The emphasis is my own. The 1906 Act now derives its power from s 
12(a) of the Senior Courts Act 2016.
48 Re JSB (A Child) [2010] 2 NZLR 236 (HC).
49 Re Jones (deceased) [1973] 2 NZLR 402 (SC).
50 Re JSB (A Child), above n 49, at [55], cited in Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at 
[38].
51 IH Jacob “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) CLP 23, cited by 
Heath J in Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [30], n 22. 
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from the Canadian judgments on the issue, the inherent jurisdiction is 
primarily a feature of procedural law, it should be exercised sparingly and 
it should not be used to make changes to substantive law.52 Nor it seems, 
should it be invoked to formulate law on issues more appropriately left 
to Parliament, or to the regulatory authorities established by Parliament 
for this purpose, even if the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction does not 
expressly conflict with any statutory provision or common law authority. 
For example, and as was noted in Re Lee (Long), the absence of express 
consent by the deceased to the posthumous use of his sperm raises 
important issues of policy.53 A man’s expressed desire to have a child in 
his lifetime does not necessarily mean he has consented to the conception 
of a child after his death.54 Professor Peart correctly notes one reason for 
this: the deceased may never have given consideration to the fact that 
he could never have a relationship with the child.55 
In England and Wales, one of the broadest applications of the inherent 
jurisdiction was in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd,56 where 
the Court established the jurisdiction to grant an ex parte order to a party 
to enter, search and remove property from the premises of its opponent 
in civil litigation when it is likely the opponent was going to destroy 
integral evidence. In that case the Court noted, however, that such an 
order could only be justified in “exceptional circumstances”. Anton 
Pillar is distinguishable from Re Lee (Long) as it was clearly rooted in 
the courts traditional jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its processes or 
actions designed to frustrate its processes, ie the imminent destruction 
of evidence. This is materially different from the loss of viability of the 
sperm of a deceased man two days after his death; this loss may result in 
the destruction of the subject matter of proceedings, but it is as the result 
of natural processes, not any attempt by persons to frustrate the litigation. 
In examining whether any statutory or regulatory provision would be 
infringed by making an order, Heath J considered s 150 of the Crimes Act 
1961 which makes it an offence inter alia to interfere with or offer any 
indignity to a human body, one of a number of legal measures recognising 
the need to treat human remains with dignity. The Court considered 
that the Act could not have been infringed since the procedure had been 
carried out by order of the Court. In this regard, he cited R v Human 
52 Ocean v Economical Mutual Insurance Co 281 NSR 2d 201 (NSCA 2009) 
per Bateman J; See also the comparative discussion of MR Ferrere “The 
Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits” (2013) 13 Otago Law Rev 107 at 
115–131.
53 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [9].
54 AB v The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2005] VSC 180.
55 Peart, above n 2, at 734. Portions of this article were cited in the judgment 
of Heath J: Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [103].
56 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 (CA).
57 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1999] Fam 
151 (CA) at 178. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435053 
109
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority; ex parte Blood,57 as support for this 
finding. In that case, Lord Woolf found that although “technically” an 
offence had been committed in the extraction and storage of the sperm, 
no prosecution could be brought since this was done with the authority 
of the Court. The reasoning here is not convincing. The Court decides 
that invoking its inherent jurisdiction does not infringe any existing 
statutory provision as it has already authorised any action that could 
have been considered an infringement, even if that authorisation is found 
to be in error. Furthermore, there is Australian authority to support the 
proposition that removing part of the testicles of a dead man would be 
an improper interference with the body and thus a crime.58
One may also question whether the order was “necessary”, within the 
meaning of the 1906 Act, to administer the laws of New Zealand. In Jones, 
for instance, Quilliam J deemed the utilisation of the judicial function 
as necessary as “The estate of the deceased must be administered.”59 In 
both Takamore v Clarke and Re JSB the necessity was obviously to resolve 
those disputes so that there may be burial. It can hardly be said that 
the posthumous extraction of sperm with the intention of using it in an 
ART procedure is necessary in the same way as it was in these cases. In 
addition, it is arguable in light of the provisions of the HART Act that 
there is no legislative gap to fill and the court usurped the functions of 
the committees established under that legislation.60 This is as the Act 
establishes an advisory committee on assisted reproductive technology 
whose role is to formulate policy through the issuing of guidelines and 
advice to the ethics committee established under the Act who approves 
applications on a case-by-case basis.61 The Act provides a number of 
guiding principles to guide the exercise of powers under it, one of which 
is that no assisted reproductive procedure should be performed on a 
person without their informed consent.62 Another is the requirement 
to consider the welfare of a potential child born as a result of an ART 
procedure.63 The definition of assisted reproductive procedure in the Act 
includes a procedure which involves the “storage, manipulation or use 
of an in vitro human gamete” and a plausible contention can be made 
that posthumous sperm retrieval is such a procedure, and it is thus for 
the advisory committee and not the High Court to formulate policy in 
this regard.64
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58 Re Gray [2000] QSC 390; Baker v Queensland [2003] QSC 2; however, cf Re 
Denman [2004] QSC 70 where Atkinson J held that nothing was outside 
the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction unless expressly excluded. 
59 Re Jones (deceased), above n 50, at 405.
60 My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this point.
61 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, ss 16, 19, 28, 32 and 
25.
62 At s 4(d).
63 At s 4(a).
64 At s 5.
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Heath J was careful to distinguish the facts before him from a case where 
consent to posthumous sperm retrieval was sought from a living but 
incompetent male who dies later. At length, he noted Professor Peart’s 
discussion as to whether it is ever appropriate for sperm to be collected 
from a comatose patient.65 Aside from the difficulty with garnering 
express consent to the posthumous use of the sperm noted above, she 
observes that some might question if it is ever appropriate to retrieve 
gametes from an incompetent person as it could be argued that the 
patient derives no benefit from the procedure.66 Of course, there are 
counter-arguments and evidence as to patient’s consent could be inferred 
from his views and values, surrounding circumstances such as the desire 
for a sibling for an existing child, or from discussions of posthumous 
conception with his surviving partner.67 Although careful not to decide 
the issue definitively, Heath J noted a number of factors against it: the 
difficulty of characterising the extraction as in the best interests of the 
patient, the inappropriateness of making a comatose man the subject 
of a court order, and the availability of a jurisdiction to extract sperm 
immediately after death.68
There is a further objection that can be made to posthumous sperm 
retrieval from a comatose man. In Y v Austin Health,69 Y’s husband 
suddenly fell seriously ill and Y sought permission for sperm to be 
removed from him in his comatose state, or upon his death. The Victorian 
Supreme Court held that the Human Tissue Act 1982 allowed the wife 
as the next of kin to give consent to the removal, as it was for ‘medical 
purposes’ within the meaning of the act. Allowing a partner to consent 
to sperm retrieval in such circumstances is troublesome. The situation 
can be distinguished from organ donation, where the next-of-kin can 
be characterised as having purely altruistic motives in consenting to 
the retrieval of the organs from the patient. The position of the wife 
in Y’s case is different in that she stands to gain from the procedure as 
she has a desire to use the sperm for reproductive purposes. This is of 
little consequence in a case such as Re Lee (Long) where the surviving 
partner and family are ad idem, but may lead to considerable difficulty 
and uncertainty in circumstances where there is conflict.70 While the 
requirement of express consent to sperm retrieval – both pre and post 
mortem – may lead to anomalies and unfairness in many cases, the 
benefits of the legal certainty afforded by such a system may outweigh 
the detriment of unfairness in individual cases.71
65 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [103]. 
66 Peart, above n 2, at 734–736.
67 At 734–736. 
68 Re Lee (Long), above n 5, at [105]. 
69 Y v Austin Health [2005] VSC 427.
70 As occurred in Hecht v Superior Court, above n 15.
71 Such was the view of the Victorian Law Reform Commission Assisted 
Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Final Report (February 2007) at 100. 
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VI Conclusion
Cases involving applications for posthumous sperm retrieval are 
invariably made at times of enormous distress to the family of the 
deceased, and the need to obtain a court order can only add to this 
distress. In a case such as this, where the surviving partner and the other 
family members all consent to the retrieval and use of the deceased’s 
sperm, it is difficult to argue that the result is not the correct one. In 
addition, the court is to be complimented in not utilising the troublesome 
Australian authority of Doodeward and treating the sperm as property, 
notwithstanding that it would have provided a convenient justification 
for the remedies being sought. It is also desirable that there be future 
judicial consideration as to whether sperm ought to be the subject of 
property rights at all, and not simply whether the applicant is entitled 
to them. 
Nevertheless, invoking the court’s inherent jurisdiction in the broad 
and expansive terms utilised by Heath J is not without its difficulties. 
The inherent jurisdiction is a creature of procedural law and directed 
towards regulating and preventing abuses of the court’s processes. With 
this in mind it is to be used sparingly, but nowhere in the judgment can be 
found any language of restraint in relation to the inherent jurisdiction Its 
role is to fill gaps and oversights by lawmakers, not to make substantive 
policy, particularly in circumstances where parliament has delegated 
policymaking in this area to specialist committees under the HART Act.
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